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Chinese Banks' Reemergence in the United States
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1991, the expansion of Chinese banking oper-
ations in the United States ceased due to heightened federal regu-
lations.' This lasted until July 14, 2008, when the New York State
Banking Department licensed China Merchants Bank ("CMB") to
begin conducting branch operations in New York after receiving
approval from the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB"). 2 The CMB
licensure is merely the beginning of a wave of expansion by Chi-
nese banks into the United States which includes the recent FRB
approvals in late 2008 for Industrial and Commercial Bank of Chi-
na ("ICBC")3 and China Construction Bank ("CCB") to also es-
• 4
tablish branch operations. This is particularly significant for
ICBC and CCB are two of the four main Chinese government-
held commercial banks which now rank as some of the largest fi-
nancial institutions in the world Only five years ago, these same
two financial institutions were considered to be "technically insol-
1. Press Release, N.Y. St. Banking Dept., New York Banking Department Li-
censes China Merchants Bank; First New Chinese Branch to Open in U.S. in 17
Years (July 14, 2008), http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr080714.htm [hereinafter
CMB press release].
2. See id.; Legal Developments, Order Approving Establishment of a Branch:
China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd. Shenzhen, People's Republic of China, 94 FED. RES.
BULL. C24 (2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2008/pdf/
legalq407.pdf [hereinafter CMB approval].
3. Legal Developments, Order Approving Establishment of a Branch: Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China, Limited Beijing, People's Republic of China, 94 FED.
RES. BULL. C114 (2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bullet
in/2008/pdfllegalq308.pdf [hereinafter ICBC approval].
4. Order Approving Establishment of a Branch: China Construction Bank, Bei-
jing, People's Republic of China, Fed. Res. Sys. (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders2008l2O8al.pdf [hereinafter CCB ap-
proval] (approving establishment of CCB branch).
5. See, e.g., Lu Jianxin & Andrew Torchia, China ICBC Tops Citigroup as
World's Biggest Bank, REUTERS, July 23, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/bank
ingfinancial-SP/idUSSHA22866820070723; also Mitchell Silk & Richard Malish, Le-
gal Implications of a Rising China: Are Chinese Companies Taking Over the World?,
7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 105,116 (2006).
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vent.",6 They required massive capital injections and improved
oversight by the Chinese government as part of a restructuring ef-
fort in order to become financially viable and comply with U.S.
standards for entry .
The FRB decision to permit entry to these banks into the
United States should be viewed positively as it affirms the success
of the Chinese banking system reforms and opening the door to
greater interdependence with one of our largest trading partners.
Despite the political resistance and potential drawbacks associated
with greater investment by Chinese entities in the United States,
this development does have positive implications for the U.S.
economy. Part II of this note examines the 1991 legislative action
that previously prevented expansion of Chinese banks.8 Part III
discusses the review procedures for foreign banks seeking entry in-
to the United States.9 Part IV lays out the reforms to the Chinese
financial regulatory system that were necessary for compliance,'0
and Part V addresses the implications of Chinese bank branches in
the United States."
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN BANKS AND THE FOREIGN
BANKING SUPERVISION ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1991
By 1991, two Chinese banks, the Bank of China ("BOC")
and the Bank of Communications, had established branches in the
United States" under the International Banking Act of 1978
("IBA"). 13 The IBA provided certain safeguards for U.S. consum-
ers such as placing minimum limits on reserve capital of foreign
branches in the United States. 4 It did not, however, require the
6. See Silk & Malish, supra note 5, at 124-125.
7. See id.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. BOC and Bank of Communications began branch operations in New York in
1981 and 1991 respectively. See REUTERS, China Bank Branch, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1981, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9901E2DC143BF934A3575BC0
A967948260. Bank of Communications Co., Ltd., History, http://www.bocomny.com!
eng/develop.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006).
14. See Ann E. Misback, The Foreign Bank Supervision Act of 1991, 79 FED. RES.
[Vol. 13
2009] CHINESE BANKS
FRB to analyze the banking institution's financial stability or the
regulatory strength of the home country in determining whether to
grant it an operating license or permit the FRB to revoke that li-
cense once granted in many circumstances. 5
After some troubling banking scandals in the late 1980s,
particularly one resulting from a large international bank holding
company that was established in countries with lax oversight, Con-
gress increased regulation over foreign banking operations in the
United States by passing the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhance-
ment Act of 1991 ("FBSEA"). 16 The FBSEA establishes the FRB
as the gatekeeper for all foreign banking institutions seeking to
begin operations in the United States. 17 The federal approval
process did not replace the state or federal licensing system. 18 Ra-
ther, it provided safeguards in an effort to protect the financial sys-
tem from fraud, money laundering, and financial instability.19  It
was these heightened restrictions that foreclosed the expansion of
branch banking operations of Chinese banks in the United States
since 1991.' 0
BULL. 1 (1993), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m4126/is-nlv79/ai_1
3399961.
15. See id. at 1 ("[IBA] did not require prior federal review of foreign bank entry
into the U.S. market, nor did it permit a federal role in the termination of a state-
licensed branch.").
16. For example, one of the major scandals that created the perceived need for
more regulation was the collapse of Bank of Credit and Commerce International
("BCCI"), a banking entity with holding companies that were established in nations
that lacked oversight, such as Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands. See, e.g., LISSA
L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICE
ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS, 909-911 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the legislative
response to the banking scandals of the late 1980s). See also Sen. Comm. For. Rel.,
102nd Cong., The BCCI Affair (Comm. Print 1992) (written by Sens. John Kerry &
Hank Brown), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992-rpt/bcci/22legrec.htm
("[Current policy] needs to be replaced by a policy that threatens to withhold access
to the U.S. market for banks doing business in any nation that does not meet mini-
mum standards for regulation and the sharing of information with the United
States.").
17. See Broome & Markham, supra note 16, at 910.
18. E.g., ICBC approval, supra note 3, at C116 n.16.
19. See Broome & Markham, supra note 16, at 909-10.
20. See, e.g., CMB press release, supra note 1.
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III. APPROVAL UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATIONS
Foreign banks have several ways of expanding into the U.S.
market. They can establish a branch or more limited banking
forms, such as an agency or representative office." Under the
FBSEA, the key requirement for the operation of a foreign bank-
ing entity in the United States, besides managerial and financial
adequacy, is that it must be "subject to comprehensive supervision
22
or regulation on a consolidated basis" in its home country.22 There
are, however, different standards and exceptions depending on the
desired type of entity.23
A. Representative Offices
Representative offices, as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 3101, are
more limited banking forms that are prohibited from holding con-
sumer deposits or engaging in normal banking operations." The
threshold for entry by such a foreign bank is relaxed in this case.
The FRB requires only that the "applicant bank is subject to a su-
pervisory framework that is consistent with the activities of the
proposed office,, 25 as opposed to the more rigorous language for
branches and agencies.26
During the period from 1991 to 2007, several Chinese
banks received approval under the FBSEA for the establishment
21. See George R. G. Clarke et al., Foreign Bank Entry: Experience, Implications
for Developing Countries, and Agenda for Further Research, 18 WORLD BANK RES.
OBS. 1, 24-25 (2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=873715.
For definitions, refer to U.S.C. § 3101 (2006).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(A) (2006).
23. Approval requirements are loosened for entities that do not engage in depo-
sit-taking and other standard financial transactions. See Legal Developments, Order
Approving Establishment of a Representative Office: China Merchants Bank Shenz-
hen, People's Republic of China, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 503 (2002) [hereinafter CMB
representative office approval] (citing 12 C.F.R. 211.24(d)(2) (2002) (approving es-
tablishment of a CMB representative office)).
24. See id.
25. Id. ("in the case of an application to establish a representative office, the
standard with respect to home country supervision would be met if the applicant
bank is subject to a supervisory framework that is consistent with the activities of the
proposed office, taking into account the nature of the activities and the operating
record of the applicant.").
26. See 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(A) (2006).
[Vol. 13
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of representative offices for the purpose of soliciting customers
and acting as a U.S. liaison for banking operations in China.27
B. Branches and Agencies
The major distinction between the most limited form of
entity as opposed to branches and agencies is the ability to take
deposits and engage in direct lending. 8 According to the approval
orders, the three banks intend to "engage in . . . lending, trade
finance, and other banking services," in addition to the taking of
29corporate deposits.
In seeking to establish a branch, the "consolidated basis"
language of the FBSEA applies. However, according to 12 U.S.C.
§ 3105(d)(6)(A)-(B) (2006), this requirement can be disregarded
if:
A ...
(i) The appropriate authorities in the home country of the
foreign bank are actively working to establish arrange-
ments for the consolidated supervision of such bank; and
(ii) [Other factors, such as financial and managerial ade-
quacy, furnishing of information, etc.] are consistent
with approval.
B ... The [FRB] shall also consider whether the foreign bank has
adopted and implements procedures to combat money
laundering ... [and] whether the home country of the for-
eign bank is developing a legal regime to address money
laundering...
Though the FRB refused to find that CMB, ICBC, and
CCB were subject to the strict regulatory standards mandated by
27. See CMB representative office approval, supra note 23, at 503; see also Fed.
Res. Bd., Structure Data for the U.S. Offices of Foreign Organizations (Dec. 31,
2002), http://www.federalreserve. gov/releases/iba/200212/bycntry.htm.
28. The major distinction between an agency and a branch is the ability to take
deposits from U.S. citizens and residents. See 12 U.S.C. § 3101(1), (3) (2006). The
entry standard for both of these entities is the same. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d) (2006).
29. E.g., CMB approval, supra note 2, at C24.
2009]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
the FBSEA, they were permitted entry under the 12 U.S.C. §
3105(d)(6)(A)-(B) exception. 3°
C. State Approval
The FBSEA does not preempt state regulatory oversight
and approval.31 Thus, the FRB order was contingent upon the ap-
proval by the New York State Banking Department.32 Although
BOC and the Bank of Communications were established under
federal charters,33 CMB, ICBC, and CCB all sought state charters
to begin operations.34 New York foreign bank entry standards
mimic those of § 3105, and require "comprehensive supervision or
regulation on a consolidated basis. 3 5 While the FRB approvals
indicate that federal approval is not dispositive of subsequent state
approval, CMB, ICBC, and now CCB, has each received New
York regulatory approval before the following FRB approval or-
der was announced.36
IV. CHINESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REFORMS
A. The State of the Financial System Pre-2003
Chinese banks wishing to gain entry into the U.S. market
faced two challenges: receiving adequate government oversight
and showing financial stability. Prior to 1979, there was a single
30. See, e.g., id.
31. E.g., id. at C26 n.15.
32. Id.
33. See CMB press release, supra note 1 (stating that CMB is the first Chinese
bank to receive a New York State charter).
34. Press Release, N.Y. St. Banking Dept., Governor Paterson Announces Larg-
est Commercial Bank in China Opens Branch in New York State (Oct. 15, 2008),
http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr081015.htm (stating that CMB and ICBC are New
York State-chartered banks).
35. Application by a Foreign Banking Corporation for a License to Establish and
Maintain a Branch or Agency in the State of New York. N.Y. St. Banking Dept., at 7,
http://www.banking.state.ny.us/fcbnetl.pdf (citing New York law).
36. CMB and ICBC each received state regulatory approval on Aug. 7, 2007, and
Nov. 2, 2007 respectively. See Weekly Bull., N.Y. St. Banking Dept. (Aug. 17, 2007),
http://www.banking.state.ny.us/wb070817.htm (approving CMB application); see also,
Weekly Bull., N.Y. St. Banking Dept. (Nov. 2, 2007), http://www.banking.state.ny.us/
wb071102.htm (approving ICBC application).
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central bank in China, The People's Bank of China ("PBOC"), but
restructuring that took place over the next several years resulted in
the spinning off of four government-controlled institutions, includ-
ing BOC, ICBC, and CCB.37
Among the obstacles to admission into the United States
was the presence of delinquent or non-performing loans ("NPLs")
and the resulting inability to meet minimum capital adequacy
standards.38 NPLs rose mainly due to the practices of "policy lend-
ing," based on a government mandate of support to state-owned
enterprises, and "relationship-based lending," whereby banks
would lend to those organizations and individuals who had a good
relationship with the bank and without regard to the potential risk
of non-repayment.3 9 Chinese officials acknowledged the potential
pitfalls of these practices after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
40
According to some sources, having an NPL ratio of fifteen percent
or more may lead to financial instability in the broader economy.41
By some estimates, the Chinese state-owned banks had NPL per-
centages approaching twenty-five percent or more.42  Joint-stock
37. See, e.g., JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., BANKING REFORM IN CHINA: CATALYZING
THE NATION'S FINANCIAL FUTURE 8 (Feb. 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=548405 (describing the economic reforms that began in 1978 with
Deng Xiaoping in order to commercialize the previously monopolized banking sys-
tem by establishing four state-owned commercial banks).
38. See Silk & Malish, supra note 5, at 118; also, e.g., CMB approval, supra note
2, at C26 (citing achievement of capital adequacy as a reason for approval).
39. See Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People's Bank of China, Address: In-
stability and Evolution of the Financial System (Dec. 5, 2007), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/
english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=158 [hereinafter Zhou speech I].
40. Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People's Bank of China, Speech Given at
the 11F Spring Membership Conference, Shanghai (Apr. 16, 2004),
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=31 [hereinafter Zhou speech
II] ("[O]utbreak of the Asian financial crisis alerted the regulators to pay high atten-
tion to the issue of cutting down [NPLs]."). For more information on the conse-
quences of risky lending and the Asian financial crisis, refer to Paul Krugman, Fire-
sale FDI, Speech Given at NBER Conference on Capital Flows to Emerging Markets
(Feb. 20-21, 1998), http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/FIRESALE.htm (describing
theories of the economic crisis, including the making of risky loans and deflation of
asset values that resulted in an increase in NPLs and the systemic economic downturn
in Southeast Asia).
41. See Yu YONGDING, RESEARCH CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE,
CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISIS? 14 (Aug. 2001) ("The lesson from the 1980s is that financial distress is likely
to become systemic when NPLs ... reach 15 percent of total loans.").
42. See id. Estimates of NPLs abound, and were typically much higher than fig-
ures released. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Bank of China's Mounting Problems,
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commercial banks, such as CMB, which had greater private owner-
ship, did not suffer from such severe issues relating to NPLs. This
has been attributed to less government influence and control.43
Other problems recognized in the Chinese financial system
in the late 1990s and 2000s were corruption, money laundering,
and the lack of transparency that resulted from poor regulatory
oversight. 4 One notable example occurred in the mid 1990s,
where one of BOC's executives secured a $23 million loan for his
wife on insufficient collateral which was then improperly repaid
through funds at BOC's New York branch. The case was subse-
quently settled by BOC with U.S. and Chinese regulators, giving
them each $10 million in fines.45 In response to such scandals and
in seeking better enforcement of the laws, China held two National
Financial Work Conferences in 1997 and 2002 to reduce local gov-
ernment influence in making loans and increasing the govern-
ment's supervision of the financial markets.46
B. Reform and Restructuring 2003-2007
1. Supervision
The 2002 Work Conference set into motion recommenda-
tions that would result in the creation in 2003 of an independent
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9805E2DC163DF932A35751COA9649C8B63 ("[As a result of loan policies] an esti-
mated 40 percent of loans by state banks are not being repaid.").
43. For example, by its own estimates, ICBC had an NPL ratio of 21.16% at 2004
year-end. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 37
(2005) [hereinafter ICBC 2005 Annual Report]. Conversely, joint-stock commercial
banks, which had greater private ownership, such as CMB, had significantly lower
average NPL ratios during the same time. See China Banking Regulatory Commis-
sion, NPLs of Major Commercial Banks as of June 30, 2004, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/
english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?doclD=824 (last visited Jan. 24, 2009) (showing joint-
stock commercial banks having an NPL ratio of 5.16%); see also RICHARD
PODPIERA, PROGRESS IN CHINA'S BANKING SECTOR REFORM: HAS BANK BEHAVIOR
CHANGED? 11 (Mar. 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=89873
2 (table 1).
44. See Rosenthal, supra note 42.
45. See Mark L. Clifford et al., The Bank of China's Black Hole, Bus. WK., Feb.
4, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_05/b3768065.htm. See
also Mark L. Clifford et al., China's Banks under a Cloud, Bus. WK., Jan. 28, 2002,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02-04/b3767049.htm.
46. See Zhou speech I, supra note 39.
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supervisory board, the China Banking Regulatory Commission
("CBRC"). 4' The CBRC was given the task of both promulgating
and enforcing standards and maintaining financial statistics. 4  The
duties of the CBRC were further focused with additional legisla-
tion at the end of 2003, giving it regulatory authority over "risk
management, internal controls, capital adequacy, asset quality,
[and] loan loss provisioning.
4 9
One of the first tasks that the CBRC undertook was to
reassess the standards for the calculation of NPLs, ° the booking of
revenue, and variable loss provisions." This was part of a broader
effort to reduce the number of NPLs and increase the viability of
the large state-owned banks for potential public stock offerings in
hopes that it would ultimately help commercialize them.52 Because
of the standards that were implemented, CBRC statistics show
that capital adequacy has improved for the nation's commercial
53banks year over year.
Another key reform was the passage of anti-money laun-
dering ("AML") regulations, enacted in 2003 and 2007.54  The
47. See id.
48. See Public Notice of the CBRC No. 1, 2003 (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.cbrc.
gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?doclD=2007032626F8837C848B194FF3E19A
FB6FFEE0O.
49. Law on Banking Regulation and Supervision, art. 21 (adopted at the sixth
session of the Standing Comm. of the Tenth Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, ef-
fective Feb. 1, 2004) (P.R.C.), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?
doclD=554.
50. See INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT
72 (2004) ("In March 2004, CBRC promulgated the 'Regulation Governing Capital
Adequacy of Commercial Banks' which required all Chinese commercial banks to
calculate their capital adequacy according to the regulation.").
51. See A Great Big Banking Gamble - China's Banking Industry, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 29, 2005 (LexisNexis).
52. See Zhou speech II, supra note 40 ("The ultimate target of reform [including
public offerings] rests in the establishment of a whole set of market system of incen-
tives and constraint.").
53. See Table of commercial banks that have reached the 8% capital adequacy
requirement, CBRC, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=2
0071102EC3EOBDFE7696242FFEE16C067D60600 (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
54. See CMB approval, supra note 2, at C25. The first anti-money laundering leg-
islation passed after restructuring of the financial system occurred in March, 2003,
with several bills from the PBOC that "put forward ... The anti-money laundering
[AML] supervisory requirements for the banking institutions, and set up the basic
framework for China's system of [AML] reporting and ... monitoring." Zhou Xiao-
chuan, Governor of the People's Bank of China, Speech to the Ministerial Joint Con-
ference on AML: Anti-Money Laundering in China: the status quo and the prospects
2009]
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enactment and enforcement of AML laws are an integral part of
the §3105(d) exception.5 ' The 2003 legislation established the
PBOC as the main authority for coordinating AML laws and pro-
vided for consequences to financial institutions that failed to
comply with its reporting guidelines. The PBOC went on to
coordinate AML efforts between twenty-three other government
agencies, termed the "AML Bureau," in examination and report-
ing efforts.57 These laws were based in part on international stan-
dards put forth by the Financial Action Task Force ("FATF"), a
body established by the G-7 nations in 1989.58
This legislation was revised in late 2006 to include more
regulation and oversight which became effective in 2007.59 This in-
volved mandated compliance with enumerated AML procedures
and home-country laws for Chinese bank branches operating in
foreign countries.6 These enactments elevated China from observ-
er status to full membership in the FATF in 2007.61
(Aug. 27, 2004) http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=54 [herei-
nafter Zhou speech III].
55. See 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(6)(B) (2006) ("[The FRB] shall also consider wheth-
er . . . the home country of the foreign bank is developing a legal regime to address
money laundering[.]").
56. The People's Bank of China, Rules for Anti-Money Laundering by Financial
Institutions, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6800&ID=13. The rules
were promulgated on Jan. 13, 2003, and made effective Mar. 1, 2003.
57. See, e.g., CMB approval, supra note 2, at C25 ("The AML Bureau was estab-
lished within the PBOC in 2003 ... [and] coordinates anti-money laundering efforts
at the PBOC and among other agencies."). See also Zhou speech III, supra note 54
("[the PBOC] formed a coordinating mechanism for AML led by the [PBOC] and
participated by ... 23 [government agency] members, [including the CBRC, by May,
2004].").
58. See CMB approval, supra note 2, at C26 ("CMB states that it has imple-
mented measures consistent of FATF."); see also FATF homepage, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/57/0,3343,en_32250379_32235720_34432121 1_11 1,00.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2009).
59. CMB approval, supra note 2, at C25; see also The People's Bank of China
Decree No. 01 (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6800
&ID=64.
60. The People's Bank of China Decree, supra note 59, at art. 14 ("The overseas
branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions shall abide by the laws and provi-
sions of the host country on [AML], and assist and cooperate with the national or re-
gional [AML] agency in their [AML] work.").
61. CMB approval, supra note 2, at C25 n.13.
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2. Bank Restructuring
The improved financial condition of these banks was also
necessary in order to receive FRB approval. Financial restructur-
ing was conducted in a series of steps, beginning with the govern-
ment issuing bonds in order to provide for more bank capital after
62the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Then, in 1999, NPLs were pur-
chased and transferred into government-controlled asset manage-
ment companies.63 This method was similar to the proposed U.S.
plans to free banks from illiquid securities as the 2008 financial cri-
sis unfolded.64 The result was that state-owned banks were able to
vastly improve their balance sheets 6 and capital adequacy ratios
reached international standards, as noted in the FRB approvals.
66
After achieving structural and financial improvements, the
next step was to conduct initial public offerings ("IPOs"). One of
the goals of this exercise was to increase the competitiveness of
these financial institutions by increasing outside ownership and in-
stilling a need for profitability in management.67  The potential
risks of substantial continuing state control has not put a damper
on investment 6' as three of the four main state-owned banks have
62. Alicia Garcia-Herrera et al., China's Banking Reform: An Assessment of its
Evolution and Possible Impact, 52 CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES 304, 313 (2006). See
also Zhou speech II, supra, note 40.
63. See Problems Left Over From History, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999 (describing
the use of asset management companies as being based upon those used for defaulted
savings and loans in the United States during the 1980s) (LexisNexis).
64. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Administration is Seeking $700 Billion for
Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008109/21/busi
ness/21cong.html (describing the U.S. counterpart to such a scheme, involving the
purchase of illiquid mortgage assets in order to shore up the balance sheets of the
leading U.S. financial banks and restore liquidity to the U.S. economy).
65. For example, ICBC was able to reduce its NPL ratio from 21.16% for fiscal
year 2004 to 4.69% in fiscal year 2005. ICBC 2005 Annual Report, supra note 43, at
37.
66. CMB approval, supra note 2, at C26 ("CMB's capital is in excess of the mini-
mum levels that would be required by the [Basel Capital] Accord and is considered
equivalent to capital that would be required of a U.S. banking organization.").
67. See Zhou speech II, supra note 40.
68. See Diya Gullapalli & James T Areddy, China Bank Stocks Tempt Investors -
Hot Listings Will Soon Be Easier to Buy, But Pros Warn About Sector's Substantial
Risks, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2006 ("[Elven after its IPO, [the Chinese government] will
continue to own roughly 70% of Bank of China."). At the time of approval, nearly
75% of ICBC was under direct or indirect government control. See ICBC approval,
supra note 3, at C114 n.3. Based upon prior evidence, simply increasing private own-
ership in banking institutions to a limited degree does not have a significant effect on
2009]
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raised significant amounts of capital in IPOs.69 With the scuttling
of unrecoverable loans, large infusions of capital, supervisory bo-
dies in place to promote greater transparency, and FRB approvals,
it would appear that these banks are ready to set foot into the U.S.
market.
There are several reasons for expanding into the United
States, such as gaining management experience in foreign markets
and increasing financial stability. ° These banks will also be able to
cater to Chinese clients in the United States, thus assisting in gov-
ernment policies to encourage investment abroad.7' This increase
in a Chinese banking presence internationally, including in the
United States, correlates with the increase in foreign direct in-
vestment made by Chinese multinationals abroad in recent years.72
V. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED CHINESE FINANCIAL PRESENCE
A. Potential Positive Results
Particularly during the financial downturn in the United
States beginning in 2007, there has been a need for liquidity in the
market, investment firms, and commercial banks as evidenced by
corporate governance. See A Great Big Banking Gamble - China's Banking Industry,
supra note 51 (comparing China's state-owned banks to those in Poland and the
Czech Republic, where significant reforms did not occur without greater private con-
trol).
69. Gullapalli & Areddy, supra note 68 (noting BOC's IPO (June 2006), CCB's
IPO (Oct. 2005)); also Brian Bremner, China's ICBC: The Biggest IPO Ever, Bus.
WK. (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/sep2006/gb20
060927_356775.htm (discussing ICBC's $19 billion IPO).
70. See Elliot Wilson, Banking on Growth, ASIAMONEY, Nov. 10, 2006, http://
www.asiamoney.com/Article/2056106/Banking-on-growth.html.
71. See Silk & Malish, supra note 5, at 112. See also Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor
of the People's Bank of China, Speech to the 11th China International Fair for In-
vestment and Trade and the International Investment Forum: Provide Financial Sup-
port to Enterprises "Going Abroad," (Sept. 8, 2007), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/
/detail.asp?col=6500&ID=145 [hereinafter Zhou speech IV] ("Qualified financial in-
stitutions will be encouraged to establish overseas operations, and explore equity in-
vestment in overseas financial institutions through merger and acquisition, in order to
provide [Chinese] enterprises with convenient financial services in their overseas in-
vestment and operation.").
72. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Invest-
ment Report 2008, Country Fact Sheet: China (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.unctad.
org/sections/dite dir/docs/wir08_fscnen.pdf (showing that Chinese outbound for-
eign direct investment has increased more than two-fold since 2005, totaling more
than $22 billion in 2007).
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recent government action.73 Permitting these Chinese banks to
operate in the United States could allow greater access to the lend-
ing market and help encourage investment by Chinese compa-
nies.74 In fact, in September, 2008, the FRB invited Chinese in-
vestment in U.S. firms strapped for capital."75
Investment opportunities may also arise through direct in-
vestment by Chinese companies. The expansion of banking opera-
tions in the United States will likely give greater access to loans,
not only to U.S. organizations, but also Chinese companies seeking
to make further inroads into the U.S. market.76 Some comparisons
have been drawn between this financial expansion and that of Jap-
anese banks twenty years ago, when the banks followed their do-
mestic customers into the United States.77 It would therefore be
possible for these Chinese banks to make equity acquisitions in
U.S. financial institutions and to facilitate Chinese companies in
further expansion into the U.S. market.
Over the long term, the FRB hopes that its permitting Chi-
nese banks to enter the United States will result in further reci-
procal opening by the Chinese financial markets to greater invest-
businesses. 8  Since entry into the World Tradement by U.S. ui  i 78r   d
73. See, e.g., Mark Landler, U.S. Investing $250 Billion in Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/business/economy/14treasury.html.
74. Chinese entities have previously made investments in infrastructure and
energy projects, such as Canadian oil shale in 2005. Evelyn Iritani, A New Player in
the Sandbox, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2005; see also Gordon M. Henry, Money Masters
From the East, TIME, Aug. 11, 1986 (showing the positive aspects of the influx of Jap-
anese banks into the United States during the 1980s led to increased liquidity for lo-
cal-level infrastructure projects).
75. Morgan Stanley in Merger Talks with Wachovia, CITIC, CHANNELNEwsASIA,
Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp-asiapacific-business/
view/376774/1/.html ("The [FRB] has been encouraging the Chinese to invest in U.S.
financial institutions.").
76. See Zhou speech IV, supra note 71. See also, e.g., Clarke et al., supra note 21,
at 2 (citing empirical evidence that entry of foreign banks leads to increased competi-
tion among lenders).
77. See Laura Mandaro, China Merchants bid for Big Apple: First of Many?
WALL ST. J. MARKET WATCH, Mar. 25, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/sto
ry/china-merchants-bank-tries-ny/story.aspx?guid={9DD88A53-F4B1-4FB-A520-
11BF182C6759. For similarities to the influx of Japanese banks in the 1980s, See Mi-
chael Quint, Japan's Giant Banks on the March, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1989, http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE6DF1631F932A35753ClA96F94826
0 ("Flush with fresh capital from a series of new equity offerings, and readily able to
raise more capital at a lower cost than other banks.").
78. See I Scratch Your Back; Chinese Banks, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2007 (Lexis-
Nexis) ("American officials hope that, in turn, restrictions on foreign firms doing
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Organization in 2001,'9 liberalization of the financial market to
foreign entities has been ongoing, but the United States is seeking
further progress in areas such as securities trading.8°
B. Potential Drawbacks and Negating Factors
While increasing investment and liquidity in the United
States could be a positive result of the re-entry of mainland Chi-
nese banks, there is still some question as to what benefits would
be experienced domestically, or if there would be any noticeable
effect at all. For example, it has been observed that state-owned
banks have shown preferential treatment for other Chinese com-
panies in lending practices. During the high-profile Unocal bid
made by CNOOC, a state-owned petroleum company, in 2005,
ICBC was one of the potential financiers that offered what was al-
leged by some to be an excessively low interest rate loan in order
to make the transaction possible.81 Although the deal ultimately
failed under political pressure, the possibility of the acquisition of
U.S. banks by Chinese banks and the favorable terms that the
state-controlled banks can potentially offer to Chinese businesses
may have the effect of reducing the business available to U.S.
banks from Chinese companies already in the United States.82 It
would also likely reduce business that would otherwise be availa-
ble to U.S. banks who wish to service incoming Chinese compa-
business in China will be relaxed, especially those that hold sway over securities trad-
ing.").
79. See e.g., Jack E. Jirak, Equity Investment in Chinese Banks: A Doorway into
China's Banking Sector, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 329, 331 (2006).
80. For example, there are limitations placed on foreign financial institutions in
terms of the size of the equity stake they can hold in a Chinese bank, though this has
been undergoing consistent liberalization. See e.g. A Chinese Coup; Banking in Chi-
na, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2006 (describing the Citigroup equity acquisition of a Chinese
bank in excess of previous laws limiting a single foreign institution to 20% ownership
as an exception to the rule) (LexisNexis). Additional restrictions apply to financial
institutions investing in the Chinese stock market, requiring institutions to undergo a
review process and then follow capital requirements and tiered investment restric-
tions. See Cheng Zhiyun, More Bars and Hoops for QFII, ECON. OBS. ONLINE, Apr.
4, 2008 (Liu Peng trans.), http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/finance-investment/2008/04/30/
98359.html.
81. See Silk & Malish, supra note 5, at 114 (describing terms of the Unocal acqui-
sition offer).
82. See Clarke et al., supra note 21, at 2.
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nies, similar to the situation of Japanese banks in the 1980s, whe-
reby the main source of business was from the expansion of Japa-
83
nese companies into the U.S. market and their need for financing.
Politics may also impede the potential of added liquidity
provided by the entry of these banks. As illustrated by the Unocal
acquisition offer, there has been resistance to expansion by Chi-
nese companies into the United States because of the perceived
• • • 84
threat of Chinese government influence over acquisitions. It was
indicated that a major obstacle to approval of the ICBC and CCB
requests was their continued government ownership. 5 Sources in-
dicated that it was only after the Chinese government was able to
placate fears about politicization of bank operations that they were
86
awarded entry.
Additionally, the business growth of the previous operating
branches and the current economic environment will likely dictate
that operations of these banks will be substantially hindered. Even
without the current economic situation, the BOC and Bank of
Communications branches that were established in New York
have not thus far achieved great profitability due to tight regula-
tion, competition, and operating costs.8s Also, in light of the signif-
icant losses that Chinese financial institutions have suffered during
the current financial crisis, the drive to expand investment in the
United States has been essentially halted for the foreseeable fu-
ture. 8
83. See Henry, supra note 74.
84. See Silk & Malish, supra note 5, at 116 ("CNOOC has taken the hardest di-
rect beating for its $6 [billion bridge loan from state-owned [ICBC]."); also Press
Release, Sen. Evan Bayh, Baye Urges Review of Chinese Bid for Unocal (July 22,
2005), http://bayh.senate.gov/news/press/release/?id=27dlfd5a-OaO9-4cde-b642c4e049
189f29 ("[Sen. Bayh] was troubled by reports that CNOOC was receiving subsidized
financing from the Chinese government.").
85. See Li Liming, Chinese Banks Get U.S. Fed's Nod to Set Up Branches, ECON.
OBS. ONLINE, June 24, 2008 (Liu Peng, trans.), http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/finance-
investment/2008/06/24/104214.html.
86. See id.
87. See Chinese Banks Head to U.S., but Profits may be Elusive, REUTERS, Apr.
15, 2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/24119158.
88. See Wealth Fund Aim Modest, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 3, 2008 ("It's estimated
that CIC suffered a 48 percent loss in its Blackstone investment as of March
[2008]."). See also Zhang Dingmin, Regulator Cai Cautions Chinese Banks on Over-
seas Acquisitions, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 13, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps
/news?pid=20601080&sid=aNvmTxUdTZLo (citing recent losses and uncertainty of
the market as key reasons to forgo further investment).
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C. Progress in the Chinese Financial Sector Must Still Be Made
While there has been a great amount of regulatory rigor
impressed upon Chinese banks, it still remains to be seen whether
or not the reforms really amount to "comprehensive supervision or
regulation on a consolidated basis" as mandated by the FBSEA.8
The CBRC, the body created to establish standards of practice and
provide supervision over the banking system, has been accused of
being inept and lacking the talent to effectively police the system.90
Worse yet, a sizeable number of CBRC employees have been ac-
cused of wrongdoing in previous years.91
Despite the public offering, the Chinese government con-
tinues to maintain a majority interest in CCB, ICBC, and BOC.92
The FRB's approval of the ICBC application states that half of the
seventy percent share owned by the Chinese government would
come under control of China's sovereign wealth fund, China In-
vestment Corporation ("CIC"), which is itself wholly owned by the
Chinese government. 93 While the CIC purports to be an autonom-
ous entity that is engaged in apolitical investment opportunities, it
remains difficult for many to discount the potential for govern-
ment influence.94 This majority ownership by the CIC and the
Chinese government will likely remain a source of suspicion for
the U.S. government.9
Third, the current level of capitalization and liquidity, par-
ticularly in the state-owned banks, is predicated upon the contin-
ued ability to manage the risk of loans made. 96 The reforms that
were made in the beginning of 2003, such as liberalizing interest
rates, creating a tier structure for risk, and attempting to reduce
89. 12 U.S.C. §3105(d)(2)(A) (2006).
90. See A Great Big Banking Gamble - China's Banking Industry, supra note 51
("[The] head of the CBRC's international department freely admits, 'we lack people
who understand commercial banking... [i]t is a headache for the CBRC."').
91. See Silk & Malish, supra note 5, at 125 ("[The] CBRC has even accused 1,228
of its own staff of being involved with $10.4 million in irregular funds in 2005.").
92. E.g., CCB approval, supra note 4, at 1 n.3.
93. See ICBC approval, supra note 3, at C114 n.3.
94. See Li, supra note 85.
95. Id.
96. See Garcia-Herrera et al., supra note 62, at 325.
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the cronyism associated with awarding loans are significant steps.97
Even with these reforms, however, the difficulty in adjusting from
a command-style economy that was once essentially void of any fi-
nancial services outside of basic savings, to creating the know-
ledge-base necessary for competent operations cannot be underes-
timated.9 8
In an environment of explosive growth, increasing deposits,
and increased market capitalization from IPOs, the danger posed
by NPLs is negligible as the banks have acted to reduce the pro-
portion of NPLs through the granting of a greater number of loans
in recent years.99 If an economic downturn did occur, as is likely
given the current global financial crisis, the amount of NPLs will
increase. °° Compounding this problem is the issue of profitability.
One legacy of central financial control, besides lending without re-
gard to commercial risk, is the lack of experienced financial pro-
fessionals to manage the financial services sector.' 1 This leaves the
state-owned banks more dependent on interest revenues and less
on fees than most modernized financial systems. An economic
slowdown in China may leave its banks more vulnerable than
comparable financial institutions in the United States and else-
where.0 3 Already, there are some signs that indicate that China's
banks, under government mandate, may be required to focus their
efforts more domestically on economic stimulus projects that may
97. See A Great Big Banking Gamble - China's Banking Industry, supra note 51.
98. See Thomas R. Gottschang, The Asian Financial Crisis and Banking Reform
in China and Vietnam, 6 (College of the Holy Cross, Dept. of Econ., Working Paper,
No. 02-02, Aug. 2001), http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/RePEc/Gott
schangAsianBanking.pdf (describing the difficulties in transitioning from a com-
mand-style economy to a capitalist one).
99. See Garcia-Herrera et al., supra note 62, at 325.
100. See id. (stating that NPLs will increase for these institutions in a weakened
economic environment since fundamental changes in loan making have not been
made).
101. See Gottschang, supra note 98, at 6 (citing the previous command-style econ-
omy as being responsible for the lack in financial service professionals).
102. See id. See also Silk & Malish, supra note 5, at 124 ("China's banks [had a re-
turn on investments] of 0.5 percent in 2005, the worst in Asia ... Chinese banks are
too dependent on loan income.").
103. See A Great Big Banking Gamble - China's Banking Industry, supra note 51
("[Due to low profitability,] even a tiny deterioration in business conditions that ei-
ther reduces margins or increases bad loans would wipe out earnings at China's
banks.").
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result in many of the most recent reform efforts being compro-
mised.' °4
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision by the FRB to permit the operation of CMB,
ICBC, and CCB in the United States is indeed a monumental, pos-
itive development. Not only does it potentially mean more in-
vestment in the United States at a time when it is needed by a
country with the largest foreign exchange reserve holdings in the
world, 105 it is also an affirmation of the years of reform that the
Chinese financial system has undergone in preparation for its
emergence on the international stage.
While there are principally many positive aspects to these
approvals, it has yet to be seen whether the effects will be substan-
tive or merely symbolic. There has been sentiment for greater in-
vestment in the United States by Chinese companies and these
banks may provide liquidity to such transactions at a time that it is
needed. There are obstacles to such investment, however, includ-
ing political resistance and the current state of the economy gener-
ally. The banks have put up a strong showing from their NPL re-
structuring to their IPOs, which provided private capital to
supplement government ownership. However, merely passing
laws without developing a culture of transparency and trust may
present potential difficulties in achieving international prowess.
An economic downturn in China or worldwide that exacerbates
the NPL situation would also have a negative impact on the ability
of these Chinese banks to conduct business. The economic turmoil
that has been experienced globally as of late will provide adequate
104. See Victor Shih, Chinese Banks' Great Leap Backwards, WALL ST. J. ASIA,
Dec. 18, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122961611056318369.html (describing
the implications of the Chinese government's efforts to stimulate the economy and its
potential effects on recent reform efforts).
105. Clay Chandler, China's $1.2 Trillion Cash Hoard, FORTUNE, May 3, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2007/05/14/100024842
/index.htm.
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challenge to both expectations of success and profitability as they
expand abroad.
JOHN D. FITZPATRICK

